Speech by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England,
at Group of Thirty's 39th Annual International Banking
Seminar, Washington
The Bank of England's approach to retail payments begins with an
open stance toward both central bank money and commercial bank
money. While there may not be a strong need to anchor retail
payments solely in central bank money, this does not imply a
diminished need for cash. We remain committed to supplying cash
as long as the public desires it, and current evidence suggests
that demand is still present. Therefore, cash will continue to be
available.
Turning to the wholesale payment landscape and payment system
settlement, the role of central bank money becomes more
significant. Unlike retail payments, high-value wholesale
payments and settlements rely on reserve accounts maintained at
central banks, which are directly backed by the state. This makes
central bank money the core liquid asset and, effectively, the
anchor of the banking system. Thus, while we may adopt a neutral
stance toward the medium used for retail payments, wholesale
payments and settlements require central bank money to maintain
stability.
The Bank of England is also heavily invested in promoting digital
innovation within the wholesale sector. By enabling digital
advancements, we can support the system's anchor in central bank
money while upholding our objectives of monetary and financial
stability. Our recent Discussion Paper delves further into this
area, detailing experiments that include a tokenized digital form
of central bank money.
On the topic of retail payments, it's essential to ask whether
economic considerations support an indifference between central
and commercial bank money. From my perspective, maintaining a
balance between the two is preferable. Commercial banks, after
all, use their funds to extend credit directly to consumers, a
role central banks do not fulfill. Shifting this balance could
potentially complicate the credit system due to the
interdependence of commercial bank lending and fractional reserve
banking, which relies on the singleness of money.
Furthermore, we must consider whether digital payments in the
retail space necessitate a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
In principle, I believe that innovation within commercial bank
money is the ideal pathway for retail payments. However, if
commercial banks cannot sufficiently innovate, central banks may
need to step in as the primary drivers of change. For this
reason, preparing for the possibility of a retail CBDC remains a
prudent step, as commercial banks have not yet provided
convincing evidence of progress in retail payments innovation.
The potential for innovation stagnation raises concerns. For
money to effectively serve as a medium of exchange, two elements
are crucial: the "train," representing the economic claim
(typically tied to commercial banks), and the "rails,"
representing the technology or infrastructure enabling exchanges.
Historically, barriers such as market power concentrations have
hindered innovation in payment infrastructures. It is critical to
address these structural issues to ensure that commercial bank
money meets the evolving needs of its users. Absent sufficient
innovation in commercial bank money, central banks may find
themselves the primary facilitators of retail payment
advancements. While this is not my preferred outcome, it remains
a possibility that cannot be dismissed.
In conclusion, I extend my gratitude to Sarah Breeden, Victoria
Cleland, Karen Jude, Nick Maclaren, Harsh Mehta, and Ali Moussavi
for their invaluable assistance in preparing these remarks. Thank
you.