The Deputy Prime Minister (Oliver Dowden) With permission, I will
make a statement about malicious cyber-activity targeting the
United Kingdom by actors that we assess are affiliated to the
Chinese state. I want to update the House on our assessment of this
activity and to reassure it on the steps that the Government have
taken to shore up our resilience and hold those actors to account.
I know that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the
Chamber will recognise...Request free
trial
The Deputy Prime Minister ()
With permission, I will make a statement about malicious
cyber-activity targeting the United Kingdom by actors that we
assess are affiliated to the Chinese state. I want to update the
House on our assessment of this activity and to reassure it on
the steps that the Government have taken to shore up our
resilience and hold those actors to account.
I know that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the
Chamber will recognise the seriousness of this issue,
particularly in a year when so many democratic elections will be
taking place around the world. Members will want to be reassured
that the Government are taking steps to address the associated
threat.
I can confirm today that Chinese state-affiliated actors were
responsible for two malicious cyber-campaigns targeting both our
democratic institutions and parliamentarians by, first,
compromising the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission between
2021 and 2022, as was announced last summer, and secondly, by
attempting reconnaissance activity against UK parliamentary
accounts in a separate campaign in 2021.
Later today, a number of our international partners, including
the United States, will issue similar statements to expose this
activity and to hold China to account for the ongoing patterns of
hostile activity targeting our collective democracies. Mr
Speaker, you and parliamentary security have already been briefed
on this activity. We want now to be as open as possible with the
House and with the British public, because part of our defence is
in calling out this behaviour.
This is the latest in a clear pattern of hostile activity
originating in China, including the targeting of democratic
institutions and parliamentarians in the United Kingdom and
beyond. We have seen this in China’s continued disregard for
universal human rights and international commitments in Xinjiang,
in China’s erasure of dissenting voices and stifling of the
opposition under the new national security law in Hong Kong, and
in the disturbing reports of Chinese intimidation and aggressive
behaviour in the South China sea. That is why this Government
have investigated and called out so-called Chinese overseas
police service stations and instructed the Chinese embassy to
close them.
However, China’s cumulative attempts to interfere with the UK’s
democracy have not succeeded. Last summer, the Electoral
Commission stated that it had been a victim of a complex
cyber-attack between 2021 and 2022. That was the work of Chinese
state-affiliated actors who gained access to the Electoral
Commission’s email and file-sharing systems, which contain copies
of the electoral register. As the Electoral Commission stated in
2023, when that attack was first made public, the compromise has
“not affected” the security of elections. It will not impact how
people register, vote or otherwise participate in democratic
processes. I want to reassure people that the compromise of that
information, although obviously concerning, typically does not
create a risk to those affected. I want to further reassure the
House that the commission has worked with security specialists to
investigate the incident and remove the threat from its systems,
and has since taken further steps to increase the resilience of
its systems.
In addition, the National Cyber Security Centre assesses that it
is almost certain that the Chinese state-affiliated cyber-actor
known as APT31 attempted to conduct reconnaissance activity
against UK parliamentary accounts during a separate campaign in
2021. Hon. Members may recall that APT31 was one of several
cyber-actors attributed to the Chinese Ministry of State Security
by the UK and its allies in July 2021. That email campaign by
APT31 was blocked by Parliament’s cyber-security measures; in
this case, it was entirely unsuccessful. However, any targeting
of Members of this House by foreign state actors is completely
unacceptable.
Taken together, the UK judges that those actions demonstrate a
clear and persistent pattern of behaviour that signals hostile
intent from China. That is why the UK has today sanctioned two
individuals and one entity associated with the Chinese
state-affiliated APT31 group for involvement in malicious
cyber-activity targeting officials, Government entities and
parliamentarians around the world. We are today acting to warn of
the breadth of targeting emanating from Chinese state-affiliated
actors such as APT31, to sanction those actors who attempt to
threaten our democratic institutions, and to deter both China and
all those who seek to do the same.
Last week, at the summit for democracy in Seoul, I said that we
would call out malicious attempts to undermine our democracy
wherever we find them. This is an important tool in our armoury
and today we are doing just that. The UK does not accept that
China’s relationship with the UK is set on a predetermined
course, but that depends on the choices China makes. That is why
the Foreign Office will be summoning the Chinese ambassador to
account for China’s conduct in these incidents. The UK’s policy
towards China is anchored in our core national interests. We will
engage with the Chinese Government where it is consistent with
those interests, but we will not hesitate to take swift and
robust actions wherever the Chinese Government threaten the UK’s
interests—we have done so today and previously. This Government
will continue to hold China and other state actors accountable
for their actions.
We will also take serious action to prevent this behaviour from
affecting our security. The steps we have taken in recent years
have made the UK a harder operating environment for foreign state
actors seeking to target our values and our institutions. Through
the National Security Act 2023, we now have, for the first time,
a specific offence of foreign interference. That new offence will
allow law enforcement to disrupt state-linked efforts to
undermine our institutions, rights or political system.
Our National Security and Investment Act 2021 has overhauled our
scrutiny of investment into the United Kingdom by giving the
Government powers to block, unwind or put conditions on
investments that could create national security risks. We have
significantly reduced China’s involvement in the UK’s civil
nuclear sector, taking ownership of the CGN stake in the Sizewell
C nuclear power project and ensuring Chinese state-owned nuclear
energy corporations will have no further role in the project.
We have put in place measures to prevent hostile infiltration of
our universities, including protecting campuses from interference
through the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023. The
Procurement Act 2023 includes national security devolvement
provisions that allow us to act where we see malicious influence
in our public procurement. I have taken steps to reduce the
Government’s exposure to Chinese operators, banning Hikvision and
TikTok from Government buildings and devices. Through the
national cyber-security strategy, we are investing £2.6 billion
to increase the cyber-resilience of our critical national
infrastructure by 2025, making the most important parts of our
digital environment a harder target for state and non-state
actors.
The Government are continuing to build the tools, expertise and
knowledge to respond to the systemic challenge that China poses
to the United Kingdom’s security and its values. The integrated
review refresh in 2023 took steps toward this, doubling funding
for a Government-wide programme, including investment in Mandarin
language training and deepening diplomatic expertise.
We must be clear that this is not a problem for the Government to
solve alone. That is why we created the National Protective
Security Authority within MI5 to help businesses and institutions
play their part in protecting our security and prosperity. The
NPSA will help organisations in the UK’s most sensitive fields,
including critical national infrastructure operators and
world-leading science and tech sectors, to protect themselves
against state threats. I set up the economic security
public-private forum to ensure businesses and business leaders in
crucial sectors understand the threat to the UK and what they can
do to defeat it.
In Parliament, the National Cyber Security Centre has launched an
opt-in service for Members of both Houses. This allows the NCSC
to alert high-risk individuals if they identify evidence of
malicious activity on their personal devices or account, and
swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their
information. Today, the NCSC has published new guidance for
political organisations, including political parties and
think-tanks, which will help these organisations take effective
action to protect their systems and their data. The NCSC is also
working with all political parties to increase the uptake of
their active cyber-defence services in the lead up to a general
election. A key component of increasing our resilience is
supporting the NCSC and parliamentary authorities by taking up
that cyber-security offer. I urge all Members of this House to do
so. I will be writing to colleagues later today, setting out
again the steps that they can take.
At the summit for democracy, I was struck by the powerful
strength of our collective voices when we work together to defend
our democratic freedoms. The summit provided the United Kingdom
Government with a platform to build international agreements on a
new global Government compact on countering deceptive use of AI
by foreign states in elections. It is important and welcome that
our partners across the Five Eyes, as well as those in Europe and
the Indo-Pacific, are standing in solidarity with our efforts to
call out malicious cyber-activity. I pay tribute to the dedicated
public servants, whose painstaking work has continued to expose
the reality of the threat we face.
Our political processes and institutions have not been harmed by
these attacks. The Government will continue to call out and
condemn this kind of activity in the strongest terms. We will
continue to work with our allies to ensure that Chinese
state-affiliated actors suffer the consequences of their
behaviour. We will take preventive action to ensure these
attempts do not succeed. The cyber-threat posed by
China-affiliated actors is real and serious, but it is more than
equalled by our determination and resolve to resist it. That is
how we defend ourselves and our precious democracy, and I commend
this statement to the House.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Speaker
Order. This was an important statement, which is why it has run
on quite a lot longer than the normal 10 minutes. I am sure
everybody will agree that if the two Front-Bench speakers need a
little extra time, we will be flexible in exactly the same way. I
call the shadow Secretary of State, .
3.50pm
Mr (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement, and for
advance sight of it. It is a statement about which there has been
significant briefing in the press over the past couple of days.
On questions of national security, Labour will support the
Government in efforts to counter attempts by China, or any other
state, to interfere with or undermine the democratic process, or
attempts to stop elected representatives going about their
business, voicing their opinions, or casting their votes without
fear or favour. With that in mind, I pay tribute to the efforts
made every day by the intelligence and security services to
protect the public, and to protect our democracy and way of life.
The economic relationship between the United Kingdom and China
can never mean compromising on national security or our
democratic integrity.
The Deputy Prime Minister’s statement touches on a number of
issues, and I have some questions about them. Will he say more
about the Government’s assessment of Chinese motives? Does he
believe, for example, that Beijing wants to disrupt our
democratic process, or instead to gather data about our citizens
for some other reason? On the specific issue of the Electoral
Commission and the electoral register, why does he think that the
Chinese Government hacked what is a publicly available database?
Does he believe they were after the details of those who may not
be on a public register for good reasons, for example because
they might be employed in security-sensitive areas? Does he
believe they were after details and the personal data of
political donors, or was there some other motive?
The Deputy Prime Minister referred to the democratic electoral
process, and with an election coming it is vital that people have
confidence in their ability to register and to vote. Will he
confirm that our electronic register to vote system is
sufficiently well protected? He said that the attacks on
parliamentary accounts were unsuccessful. Does he believe that
China now wants to engage in the kind of hack and leak activity
that we have in recent years associated with Russia, in order to
compromise either individual politicians or the wider democratic
process? On sanctions, only last week the Minister of State was
reluctant to respond to the claim that the Foreign Office
“indefinitely paused” targeted sanctions against Chinese
officials late last year. Will the Deputy Prime Minister explain
what has changed in the past week?
We are grateful for the work of the Intelligence and Security
Committee of Parliament, and the report it issued on China last
year, which covered much of the same ground that the Deputy Prime
Minister covered in his statement. When discussing individual
politicians, paragraph 98 of that report stated:
“Targets are not necessarily limited to serving politicians
either. They can include former political figures, if they are
sufficiently high profile. For example, it is possible that David
Cameron’s role as Vice President of a £1bn China–UK investment
fund…was in some part engineered by the Chinese state to lend
credibility to Chinese investment,”.
What have the Government done to look into that allegation from
the Intelligence and Security Committee? How can Ministers ensure
that those leaving politics are not targeted in that way?
In that spirit, Mr Speaker, I have read reports that the
Conservative Back-Bench 1922 committee is to be briefed on these
matters later today. Given the importance of national and
democratic security to all the parties in this House, is the
Deputy Prime Minister intending to arrange a briefing for the
Leader of the Opposition, the Intelligence and Security Committee
and, indeed, the other political parties represented in the
House?
Experts in this field have warned of China’s voracious appetite
for data, and its potential uses as computing power improves—for
example, as quantum computing develops. The UK’s record on data
security is patchy, to put it mildly. What are the Government
doing to protect complex and valuable datasets from being stolen
now, possibly in order to be manipulated later by more powerful
computers that are controlled by authoritarian adversaries?
Finally, Mr Speaker, on the broader issue, does the fact that the
Deputy Prime Minister chose to make this statement today signal a
fundamental reassessment of the overall threat? He referred to
the United States and our allies. On 12 February, the US
Administration warned Congress that the cyber-threat from China
was changing. Previously, a threat that largely involved spying
and influencing now looked like it was getting ready to disrupt
critical American infrastructure—aviation, energy, healthcare and
other sectors. Is it now the UK Government’s view that we should
change our assessment of the threat in a similar way? If so, this
is of the utmost importance, and we would need to know what
corresponding improvements the Government would make to the
preparedness of our critical infrastructure, because if the
threat really has changed then so too should our response.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. I shall seek
to address as many of them as I can.
When it comes to Chinese motivations, ultimately, it is a matter
for the Chinese to be able justify their motivations, but the
points that the right hon. Gentleman made were apposite. First,
the Chinese look at successful democratic countries, such as the
United Kingdom, Japan or the Republic of Korea where I was last
week, and they want to seek to undermine them. It is no surprise
therefore that they should seek to interfere in electoral
processes, in the way that we have seen conduct from Russia that
aligns with that. Indeed, the successful democratic elections
around the world right now stand in contrast to the sham
elections that we saw in Russia last weekend.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the public record of
the Electoral Commission, I think that that is the essence of
what has happened here. These attacks and these attempts were
ultimately pretty unsuccessful. I reassure the right hon.
Gentleman and Members of this House that there was no
infiltration of the closed register of the Electoral Commission,
so the concerns that he raised have not arisen. On the further
strengthening of the electoral register, that is precisely the
work that the National Cyber Security Centre does in
co-ordination with GCHQ, working with Government agencies,
including the Electoral Commission.
The right hon. Gentleman was right to raise the risk of hack and
leak. It is certainly something that we saw in previous
elections, and I remain concerned. I also remain very concerned
about artificial intelligence, deep fakes in particular, being
used to disrupt elections, hence the work that I undertook at the
conference last week and the progress that we are making with the
accord on artificial intelligence use by malign states.
In relation to targeted sanctions, it is not the case that the
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office paused targeted
sanctions. On the conduct of the former Foreign
Secretary—[Interruption.] I am not sacking the Foreign Secretary
from the Dispatch Box. On the conduct of the current Foreign
Secretary, who sits in the other place, all appointments to
Government are subject to the usual propriety and ethic
processes. is addressing the 1922
Committee in his capacity as Foreign Secretary in the usual way,
addressing a wide range of issues. It is not a specific briefing
on this issue, but if leaders of the principal Opposition parties
wish to have a further briefing on this issue I am of course very
happy to facilitate that, in the way that they know I have done
in relation to other national security issues.
We are highly alert to the risks of hostile states hoovering up
currently quantum-encrypted information that could subsequently
be decoded with advances in quantum computing. We do extensive
work with the National Cyber Security Centre and the Ministerial
Cyber Board on critical national infrastructure to ensure that we
guard ourselves against exactly that risk. On our relationship
with China more broadly, Members of this House should take this
moment very seriously. It is a grave moment, against a backdrop
of an escalating threat from China, and we will take
proportionate action in response to that escalating threat.
(Chingford and Woodford
Green) (Con)
Tomorrow, it will be three years since parliamentarians here were
sanctioned; your defence of us, Mr Speaker, has been remarkable.
Although I welcome the two sanctions from the Government, it is a
little bit like an elephant giving birth to a mouse. The reality
is that in those three years the Chinese have trashed the
Sino-British agreement and been committing murder, slave labour
and genocide in Xinjiang. We have had broken churches, and, in
Hong Kong, false court cases against Jimmy Lai. My question is:
why two? America has sanctioned more than 40 people in Hong Kong;
we have sanctioned none, and only three lowly officials in
Xinjiang. Surely the integrated review should be changed. China
is not an epoch-defining challenge, strange as that may be, but
it is surely a threat. Can the Government now correct that, so
that we all know where we are with China?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend’s views are well known to me, I genuinely
welcome the constructive, at most times, debate that I have with
him, but nobody should be in any doubt about the gravity of this
matter. These are not the actions of a friendly state, and they
require our serious attention. As he has described, this is an
escalating situation. The measures that we have announced today
are the first step, but the Government will respond
proportionately at all times to the facts in front of us. No one
should be in any doubt about the Government’s determination to
face down and deal with threats to our national security, from
wherever they come.
Mr Speaker
I call the SNP spokesperson.
(Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement, and for
advanced sight of it. In the statement, he said:
“I have taken steps to reduce the Government’s exposure to
Chinese operators, banning Hikvision and TikTok from Government
buildings and devices”,
but the reality is that the Hikvision ban extends only to
sensitive sites, despite the fact that we have pushed him to
ensure that it extends to all public buildings. Surely the
majority of things that happen in government involve some sort of
confidential information. Will he confirm whether he is extending
the ban beyond sensitive sites to all Government sites, as we
have been calling for for a number of years? The attacks on the
Electoral Commission and parliamentarian accounts happened nearly
three years ago. Will we be sitting here in 2027 hearing about an
attack that is happening right now? The EU is currently
delivering €240 million for cyber-security to improve its
collective resilience. Will the Government deliver an equivalent
fund for these islands? Finally, without more action, can he give
us real assurances that this year’s general election will take
place without international interference?
The Deputy Prime Minister
As the hon. Lady is aware, we currently ban Hikvision, and indeed
any other Chinese technology relating to CCTV. We continue to
keep that under review. I do not rule out a further progression
in the policy, but that is not the case right now.
On the time taken, it is essential that, before Ministers stand
at the Dispatch Box and make assertions attributing such activity
to a hostile state, we are absolutely sure of the basis on which
we do so. That requires extensive work by our intelligence
agencies, it requires fine judgments to be made, and it requires
work to be done with our allies around the world—there will be
comments from the United States shortly after my statement. I
would rather we did this in the proper way.
We have invested £2.6 billion on cyber-security during this
spending review. I can never be totally confident in relation to
cyber-security—no Government Minister anywhere in the world can
be; it is an environment in which the risks are escalating all
the time and are turbocharged by artificial intelligence—but I
can assure the hon. Lady and other Members that we are constantly
increasing our activity and vigilance in the face of it.
(East Worthing and Shoreham) (Con)
Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford
Green ( ), I am rather
underwhelmed by this statement. In the three years since seven
parliamentarians were sanctioned, we have been subject to
intimidation, impersonation and hacking, as have the families of
exiles from China with whom we have associated. Today, the Deputy
Prime Minister has described hostile actors’ malign acts towards
the integrity of our electoral system and parliamentary
democracy—foreign interference—and sanctioned two individuals and
one company employing 50 people with a turnover of £208,000. Does
he think that that is proportionate, and can he confirm that the
Government will put the whole of the Chinese Communist Government
in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration
scheme?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My hon. Friend may be aware that we are currently in the process
of collective Government agreement in relation to the enhanced
tier of the foreign interference registration scheme. Clearly,
the conduct that I have described today will have a very strong
bearing on the decision that we make in respect of it.
In relation to the sanctions, it is worth noting that this is the
first time that the Government have imposed sanctions in respect
of cyber-activity. I believe that they are proportionate and
targeted, but they also sit in the context of actions that we
have been taking with our international allies. They are a first
step, and we remain totally open to taking further steps as the
situation evolves. The path we are going on with this is
clear.
(North Durham) (Lab)
My first reaction is: “Is that it?” The spin was clearly not
matched by this statement. The Deputy Prime Minister says that
there is an issue around nuclear and higher education. That is
because the Government encouraged China to invest in nuclear, and
cut the budgets of our universities so they are reliant on
Chinese students. The Deputy Prime Minister also ducked the
question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for
Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) about . Will publish all the money and
interactions that he had with Chinese entities when he was out of
government? The Deputy Prime Minister says that he is committed
to the security services. Why, then, in the Budget on 6 March,
was the security budget cut by £600 million next year? That is
not a sign of a Government who are taking this issue
seriously.
The Deputy Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary has provided a full declaration of all his
interests—
Hon. Members
No he hasn’t!
The Deputy Prime Minister
I will take lectures from Labour Members on action in relation to
security threats with a pinch of salt. It was this Government who
introduced the National Security and Investment Act 2021; it was
this Government who passed the Higher Education (Freedom of
Speech) Act 2023; it was this Government who passed the National
Security Act 2023—none of which we saw from the Labour party
during its years in office.
(Fareham) (Con)
We have seen reports of espionage on UK campuses, aggression on
UK soil, massive cyber-attacks and hostile corporate takeovers.
It is abundantly clear that China is a hostile state and poses an
unprecedented threat to our national security. As Home Secretary,
I oversaw the enactment of the National Security Act, which built
the foreign influence registration scheme designed specifically
to deal with such threats so that our authorities have the right
powers to tackle them. Is there not a compelling case for China
to be listed on that register, and if not now, when?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I pay tribute to my right hon. and learned Friend for the work
that she did—she and I worked closely together on many of those
things. There is a strong case, and my right hon. and learned
Friend will be aware of the process that we go through to
determine that. It has to be agreed through a collective
Government agreement.
On the point about hostile states, though, I disagree with my
right hon. and learned Friend; it is not the case that any Five
Eyes nation has designated China explicitly as a hostile state.
The language I have used in relation to China reflects the
complex situation of that state, but I want colleagues to be in
no doubt about the direction that Government policy is taking,
how gravely we take this issue, and the overall escalation of our
stance on it.
Dame (Wallasey) (Lab)
I, too, am quite surprised at the difference between what was
briefed and some of the information that the Deputy Prime
Minister has given us today, and the sum of the action taken. He
said that the Government had taken rapid and robust action when
talking about things that happened three and four years ago, and
the sanctioning of two individuals and a minor company does not
seem to meet the definition of robust. How does he think that
taking the tiny steps he has announced today will deter the
Chinese from carrying on in the way they have been doing, as the
Deputy Prime Minister has outlined and is very clear from the
China report that the Intelligence and Security Committee was
finally allowed to publish late?
The Deputy Prime Minister
First, in relation to briefings, I can categorically assure you,
Mr Speaker, and Members of this House that there has been no
briefing whatsoever from me or my Department in respect of this
matter. As ever, I would say, “Don’t believe everything that you
read in the newspapers.”
As for the overall direction of Government policy, it is clearly
set. This is not just about offensive action, but the extensive
defensive action we have taken to continuously increase the
security of our Government systems. I make no apology for the
time we have taken to properly call out China in this respect. I
want to make sure that when I stand at the Dispatch Box, I am
able to do so on a solid basis, painstakingly put together by our
allies and our security agencies.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Speaker
Who shall we go to? A former Attorney General, no less.
Sir (Northampton North) (Con)
The front page of The Telegraph today reports Whitehall sources
saying that China, Russia and Iran are even fuelling
disinformation about the Princess of Wales to destabilise the
nation. Hostile states with leaders who fake their own elections
and are hated by their own people are spreading wild conspiracy
theories about the royal family, among many other things—our
royal family who are hugely popular and much loved. Does the
Deputy Prime Minister agree that British people will ignore that
grotesque disinformation despite the pathetic attempts of those
autocratic regimes?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for raising the issue,
and extend my best wishes to members of the royal family at this
very difficult time. The appalling speculation that we have seen
over the past few weeks comes as a reminder to us all that it is
important for us to ensure that we deal with valid and trusted
information, and are appropriately sceptical about many online
sources.
(Glasgow South)
(SNP)
As one of the parliamentarians targeted, can I thank the security
officials for the work they did to repel this attack? I am glad
it was not successful.
However, I have to say that the Deputy Prime Minister has turned
up at a gunfight with a wooden spoon. The attack that he stood up
and announced at the Dispatch Box happened three years ago, but
he comes to the House and calls this “swift”. He comes to the
House and says he has taken robust action but, as the hon. Member
for East Worthing and Shoreham () mentioned, the entity he has sanctioned has fewer
than 50 employees and has a turnover of £200,000 a year. He has
not sanctioned a single Chinese state official. He has not even
told the House whether the Chinese ambassador has been summoned,
after what he has come to the Dispatch Box to tell us today.
[Interruption.] Forgive me, he says he has been summoned—my
apologies.
Can I press the Deputy Prime Minister on the enhanced tier of the
foreign influence registration scheme? What possible good excuse
could there be for not having China in that, and if we do not
take more robust action and see a proper sea change in Government
thinking, rather than this tinkering around the edges, will this
not happen more and more and get worse and worse?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I think everything about the hon. Gentleman’s question suggests
that he did not actually listen to the statement I made. I said
that there had been a démarche, and that is exactly what is
happening. I have already set out the position in relation to the
foreign influence registration system.
(Tunbridge Wells) (Con)
The Deputy Prime Minister knows that cyber-attacks on UK
institutions come from a wide range of actors—states and
criminals—as we saw in the recent big attack on the British
Library, and it is important that our laws are up to date to
protect against this. In 2022 the Government announced that they
would update the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018
to
“protect essential and digital services against increasingly
sophisticated and frequent cyber attacks both now and in the
future.”
In 2022 that was to be done as soon as parliamentary time
allowed. Why has it not been done, and when will it be done?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The work is pretty much complete, and as soon as parliamentary
time allows we will be bringing forward those measures.
Sir (Rhondda) (Lab)
I am sorry, but I find the Deputy Prime Minister today utterly
unconvincing. The idea that “swift” means taking three years to
publish something that has already been published by a Committee
of this House is utterly preposterous. It means that if there
were an attempt this year, we would hear about it long after the
general election and possibly after another general election
after that. The truth is that, if he actually thinks this is the
sum total of all the Chinese state’s attempts to disrupt the
British democratic system, he is wilfully blind and is therefore
dangerous.
There are two things that the Government could do immediately to
enhance confidence in this area: first, bring forward the motion
to allow the Foreign Secretary to answer questions in this House
from Members of the House of Commons; and secondly, publish the
full unexpurgated Russia report.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I am sorry that the hon. Member is not happy with the Minister of
State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my right
hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who is
sitting to my right, and who I think does an excellent job of
answering questions in this House. On the time that this has
taken, there is a difference between acknowledging, as the
Electoral Commission did, the fact that an attack has taken
place, and the process of attribution, which takes a longer
period of time for the reasons I have set out repeatedly from
this Dispatch Box.
Sir (Elmet and Rothwell)
(Con)
I am proud to have the British Library at Boston Spa in my
constituency, and I will be meeting it in a week’s time to talk
about the cyber-attack. That is just one aspect of what has
happened recently, but we are talking about the protection of
democracy as well, and the timeframes on which we are moving on
some issues does concern me. One of the big concerns will be
deepfake news profiles—with people alleged to have said things,
and videos of people allegedly doing things—at the next election.
I urge my right hon. Friend to work now to try to establish
procedures so that everybody across this House will be able to
call out efficiently the fake news that may be used to try to
influence the election. As he has said, people should be careful
what they believe, but what can people believe in unless there
are robust systems to call out what is absolutely fake?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise this issue. We
are working with tech companies on, for example, the watermarking
of images to ensure that people have a sense of whether they are
real. However, this cannot just be action from the UK Government;
we have to work internationally, which is why at the global
summit for democracy we launched the global Government compact on
countering the deceptive use of AI by foreign states in
elections. That is the United Kingdom leading across nations
around the world to ensure that we can act in co-ordination to
address this issue. Moreover, everyone in this rapidly evolving
technological world needs to be mindful of the fact that
information cannot be trusted in the way it used to be just a few
years ago.
(Tiverton and Honiton)
(LD)
The Deputy Prime Minister talked in his statement about
“the powerful strength of our collective voices”.
We can contrast the sanctions that have been announced this
afternoon with those that followed the Novichok poisoning in
2018. On that occasion, 130 Russian diplomats were expelled from
more than 25 countries, and the EU ambassador to Moscow was
withdrawn. What steps are the Government taking to co-ordinate a
robust response to this alleged attack on democracy by working
with our democratic allies?
The Deputy Prime Minister
That is exactly what we are doing. I raised the issue with
opposite numbers in Japan and Korea when I was there, and I have
raised it with the United States, with whom we have been
co-ordinating exceptionally closely. The US will be making a
statement on its actions shortly, if not currently. We have
proceeded in this way precisely to ensure that we act not alone
but with like-minded states. Interestingly, that is in relation
not just to the Five Eyes but to European partners and
international partners, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. This
issue requires that kind of co-ordinated action, at a time when
our democratic institutions not just here, but around the world,
are under increased threat. It is important that democratic
nations work together in concert, and that is exactly what we are
doing.
(The Wrekin) (Con)
May I join the Deputy Prime Minister in paying tribute to all
those who do so much in the UK intelligence community? Will he
join me in reassuring those on the shadow Front Bench that in the other place oversees
GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service, and he is probably in a
good place to know what is going on? Reference has been made to
the China report published in July 2023—I was one of the
co-authors, with one or two others in this Chamber. Page 198 of
that report referred to the UK security services facing “a
formidable challenge”. I welcome the fact that the Government
have played catch-up—that was another criticism—and have caught
up to a certain extent. I particularly welcome the £2.6 billion
over the past three years going to cyber-protection for our
critical national infrastructure.
Mr Speaker
We were going to finish because, in fairness to the Deputy Prime
Minister, he indicated that he wanted to finish early because of
other things happening around the world. If he is happy to
continue, then so I am.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I am happy to continue.
Mr Speaker
In which case, let us carry on.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I am sure that I will regret saying that, Mr Speaker.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to pay tribute to our
intelligence agencies. I see their work at first hand, day in,
day out. We are one of a very small number of countries that have
intelligence agencies of this standard. It enables us all to be
more secure.
(Exeter) (Lab)
I welcome the tone of vigilance, which is in stark contrast to
the nonchalance shown by the Johnson Government over earlier
Russian interference in our elections and the Brexit referendum.
Why should we believe the Government’s honest intentions when
they still have not implemented all the recommendations of the
Russia report?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The right hon. Gentleman will have seen the conduct of the
Government and, for example, the further sanctions we imposed on
Russia just a few months ago. We have not hesitated in taking
robust action in relation to Russia, just as we will continue to
do with any threats from China.
(South Dorset) (Con)
Bearing in mind all that my right hon. Friend has said, he may be
concerned to hear what we have heard in the Defence Committee.
English Ministry of Defence companies are having a nightmare in
employing those with specialist AI skills from university,
because they are all Chinese. Is he aware of that, and what will
he do to counter this potential threat to our security?
The Deputy Prime Minister
Clearly, anyone employed by a relevant defence company or in the
UK Government will be subject to advanced vetting, which would
likely preclude a number of the individuals my hon. Friend
described. The main thing that we have got to do is increase our
skills in this country, which is why we are investing in science,
technology, engineering and maths. We are very fortunate in
having three or four of the top 10 universities in the world in
the United Kingdom—wherever I go in the world, people look at
that with envy—which is a base from which both our intelligence
agencies and industry can draw.
(Ross, Skye and Lochaber)
(SNP)
These cyber-attacks occurred in 2021 and 2022, so we really must
ask how it has taken the Government so long to make this
statement. We should reflect on the Deputy Prime Minister saying
that these actors
“gained access to the Electoral Commission’s email and
file-sharing systems, which contain copies of the electoral
register.”
This is an election year, and it should put fear into the hearts
of all of us that the Chinese have access to the UK’s electoral
register, at a time like this when we are already worried about
bad actors, about cyber-attacks taking place and about the use of
AI.
The Deputy Prime Minister talked about taking robust action—good
grief: two individuals are being sanctioned. Reference has been
made to what happened over Novichok, when we swiftly took action
to expel diplomats from this country and around the world. I hope
that when the Chinese ambassador meets the Deputy Prime Minister,
he will be told that diplomats will be expelled. Will the Deputy
Prime Minister come back to the House tomorrow and tell us about
the robust action that he should be taking?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up,
Housing and Communities ()
You are confusing shouting with robustness.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I will answer the question slightly less aggressively than how it
was put; I will make my point in my own way. First, as the
Electoral Commission said in its statement, the data contained in
electoral registers is limited, and much of it is already in the
public domain. The Electoral Commission had already declared the
fact of the attack. What is different today is that, contrary to
some speculation at the time, we are announcing that it was in
relation to Chinese-related actors. That is what has changed. On
our overall approach, I have set out a direction. These are grave
threats, which we take seriously. We are taking proportionate
action now, and we will continue to take steps as required.
(New Forest West) (Con)
A successful deterrent requires the capability and the will to
retaliate. Have we got either?
The Deputy Prime Minister
Yes, we do, on both fronts. My right hon. Friend will be well
aware of our National Cyber Force, but I do not comment on the
conduct of that from the Dispatch Box.
(Aberavon) (Lab)
In January 2023, of Chipping Norton—prior to
his appointment as Foreign Secretary, of course—went to Sri Lanka
to drum up investment for Port City Colombo, which is a belt and
road project launched by President Xi, which many believe will
become a military base for the Chinese navy. Following Lord
Cameron’s appointment as Foreign Secretary, many freedom of
information requests have been submitted to the Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office to try to shed some light on
his visit to Sri Lanka, including who he met and what sort of
conversations took place, but to date not a single one of those
FOI requests has been complied with by the FCDO. Does the Deputy
Prime Minister agree that that is a matter of the highest public
interest and that sunlight is the best form of disinfectant, and
therefore the FCDO should comply with those FOI requests as a
matter of urgency?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office always deals
with FOI requests in the proper way. I have to say that trying to
link Chinese cyber-attacks to our current Foreign Secretary is
pretty desperate stuff. It just does not wash.
(Bournemouth East) (Con)
It is absolutely right that we call out these malicious actions,
because otherwise they will become normalised. Does the Deputy
Prime Minister agree that when it comes to our security, and
indeed our economic interests, there is an important parity
between the digital space and our physical terrain, and that that
should be reflected in defence spending? Does he also agree that
Beijing is watching today’s events and will no doubt retaliate?
Should we brace ourselves for further individual sanctions
against British personnel?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend is right to highlight the need for
investment. That is precisely why, in the last spending review
period, we put £2.6 billion into our wider cyber-defences. I am
confident that we will be able to deal with any retaliatory
action by Beijing effectively.
(Glasgow Central)
(SNP)
We should be worried about Chinese influence in various areas of
Government. Graham Barrow, the Companies House expert, has been
warning for quite some time about dubious company incorporations
that have originated in China. He believes that they are being
created using an algorithm, and there is evidence that companies
are being incorporated using stolen UK credentials, from UK
addresses, streets at a time. What conversations has the Deputy
Prime Minister had with Companies House, and would he be willing
to meet Graham Barrow to hear his conclusions?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I, or another Minister, will be happy to meet him. That is
precisely why we set up the National Cyber Security Centre, which
uses GCHQ expertise to inform our approach to cyber, and engages
with businesses and individuals. That approach is renowned and
admired around the world, because we can give high-quality advice
through the National Cyber Security Centre. Week after week, I
receive delegations from around the world who want to see what we
have done with the National Cyber Security Centre.
(Buckingham) (Con)
The £2.6 billion in additional money to counter cyber threats is
very welcome. This field is constantly evolving, and those who
wish us harm are innovating further. I accept that my right hon.
Friend will not comment on the exact detail, but will he at least
assure the House that the £2.6 billion outguns what those who
wish us harm spend on new threats?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The amount of spending compares extremely favourably with that
spent in similar G7 countries around the world. I am confident
that we have world-leading expertise, and we are constantly
evolving our capabilities in this space.
(Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement and his
answers. I had occasion just five weeks ago to see Mr Speaker
about an incident. The Deputy Prime Minister may be aware—if not,
he will be shortly—that the all-party parliamentary group for
international freedom of religion or belief, which I chair, had
its website hacked, and the text that questioned human rights
violations by China was removed. I reported it to Mr Speaker and
made him aware of what took place. It is clear that nothing
whatsoever is sacred to the Chinese. The work of the elected
Members of this House is not treated with respect. Will the
Deputy Prime Minister commit to stop handling the Chinese
oversteps—for want of a better description—with kid gloves, and
instead handle them with authority, and help China to understand
that it will not trample over democracy in this place, or
elsewhere, without being held accountable in the very strictest
terms?
The Deputy Prime Minister
We will certainly hold China to account in the way that the hon.
Gentleman describes. I will happily make sure that the
parliamentary authorities and the National Cyber Security Centre
are in touch with him about the attack that he described.
(The Cotswolds)
(Con)
We know that legacy IT systems are most likely to be
cyber-attacked. Has the Deputy Prime Minister ordered an
inventory of all Government IT equipment, to see where particular
vulnerabilities lie?
The Deputy Prime Minister
Yes. My hon. Friend is right to raise this issue. The first step
is to properly understand where those vulnerabilities lie. We
have undertaken extensive work to ensure that we know where risks
lie, and we are putting in place measures to remediate those
risks.
(Dundee West) (SNP)
This is too little, too late. It is reactive, not proactive. Two
lowly officials get sanctioned when half the UK population’s data
and electoral roll get cyber-attacked. I do not feel that the
issue is being taken seriously enough. Let me remind the House
how serious this is: in October last year, MI5 warned of the
“epic scale” of Chinese espionage, and reported that more than
20,000 people in the UK had been covertly approached online by
Chinese spies. Our Commons Intelligence and Security Committee
said that China was “prolifically and aggressively” targeting the
UK, and had managed successfully to penetrate every sector of the
UK’s economy. My question is simple: how can any of us here, or
outside in society, trust this UK Government, when they are far
too late, and do very little of what needs to be done?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I simply do not accept that characterisation, given that it was
this Government who set up the NCSC, this Government who set up
the ministerial cyber board, and this Government who invested
£2.6 billion in our cyber-defences. I have consistently warned,
time and again, about the cyber-threats facing the United
Kingdom, and we are taking steps to address them.
(Isle of Wight) (Con)
Every time the Deputy Prime Minister comes to the House, he lays
out his plans eloquently, and is more assertive; he says, “We are
doing this new thing, and that new thing, to react to the
threat.” Do we not still need much greater coherence across all
Government Departments in how we deal with the threat, whether
the issue is students, the protection of Hong Kong citizens,
intellectual property or cyber-attacks?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My hon. Friend raises an important point. I pay tribute to the
work that he has done in this space, and I have discussed the
issue with him on many occasions. He is right that the UK
Government, in common with the US Government and others around
the world, have evolved enormously in their approach to China.
The sort of China we had hoped for even a decade ago is not the
China we have now, whether we are talking about Hong Kong,
Xinjiang or elsewhere. We continue to increase our efforts on the
matters that he describes. That is precisely why we set up the
defending democracy taskforce, led by the Minister for
Security.
(East Renfrewshire)
(SNP)
The Deputy Prime Minister is right to address these issues and,
as he said, call them out, but just calling them out does not
really cut the mustard. There is certainly no appearance of
urgency. There is a worrying sense of “nothing to see here” in
some of his responses. He referenced human rights. We know well
the issues there, including the horrific forced labour and worse
faced by the Uyghur population. The action he is outlining on all
those fronts is very underwhelming, and actually a bit baffling.
Does he think that the large number of Members across the House
who are obviously very much underwhelmed by his statement are all
wrong, or is it possible that his statement somehow misses the
mark?
The Deputy Prime Minister
First of all, it is important to remember that ultimately—I want
to reassure the House and the public—these attempts were
unsuccessful. I am not being complacent; I am setting out the
facts. As for the risk, at CYBERUK in Belfast last year, I warned
that cyber-threats continue to come from the usual
suspects—Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. In the Government
security conference, I called out Russian state interference, and
we created Secure by Design. We have not hesitated to take
action, and we will continue to do so.
(Chelmsford) (Con)
Democracy is not perfect, but the right to choose who makes the
laws that govern us is really precious, and it is really scary to
hear that a foreign power might be trying to intervene in that.
Mr Deputy Speaker, as one of the few women who has spoken during
this statement, I want to remind you again how concerned I am
about the threats and harassment that women get when standing for
Parliament, especially as we get closer to an election. As well
as cyber-security, I am very concerned about physical security.
Two and a half years ago, my Essex neighbour was murdered at his
constituency surgery. Last Friday, at my constituency surgery,
the security operatives recommended by this Parliament failed to
show up for the second time this year. I am very grateful to the
Deputy Prime Minister for recently putting extra money into
security for both parliamentarians and candidates, but will he
look again at the workings of this House, and at how our security
is governed, because that funding is not getting to those of us
on the frontline?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend makes a concerning allegation, which I will
take up for the Government, working with the House authorities.
As she will be aware, we take the threat exceptionally seriously,
which is why we agreed an unprecedented increase in protective
security for Members of this House and other elected
representatives. We should all take that threat very seriously,
not least in the light of the two appalling murders of
parliamentarians that I have seen in my time in this House.
(Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
When it comes to matters of national security such as this, my
inclination is to work on a cross-party basis, and for us to show
a unified face, but does the Deputy Prime Minister not understand
that the relative weakness of the response to this terrible
series of attacks, combined with his evasiveness over questions
about the financial interests of the Foreign Secretary, is bound
to increase people’s concerns? It is understood that still has close links with the
Chinese state in respect of numerous business ventures, and it
was reported last week that the Government had secretly softened
their policy against Chinese businesses implicated in human
rights abuses. Will the Deputy Prime Minister strengthen his
response, and demonstrate by his actions and through transparency
that this soft-pedalling is nothing suspicious?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The hon. Gentleman says that we should have a cross-party
approach, and then immediately seeks, on political grounds, to
denigrate the Foreign Secretary and turn this into a party
political matter. I am afraid that he will have to choose one
approach or the other.
(Watford) (Con)
When we think ahead to the election, we should bear in mind the
point raised today about artificial intelligence and the threat
to democracy. We often talk about the concept of deepfake
news—which used to be just fake news—but this is not just about
deepfakes. It is also about the risk of rumour bombs to dissuade
people from going to the polls on the day, and about voice
clones; people are telephoned by someone pretending to be a
daughter or other family member, who says, “Do not go and vote
today.” There are many risks of which we may not even be aware,
and the data that we are talking about today may be used in
conjunction with data from Facebook and other sources to enable
people to pretend that they are something they are not. Along
with the work taking place in Government and with tech companies,
could there be an education campaign, to let the public know that
there are better ways to become aware of the risks that they may
face during the election?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My hon. Friend has made an important point. At a time of rapidly
evolving technology, particularly artificial intelligence, there
will always be limits to the ability of agencies, or companies,
to call this stuff out. There needs to be greater awareness among
the public of the risks, and of the need to treat images of this
kind with much more scepticism, and I will take that up with my
colleague the Education Secretary.
(Glasgow North West)
(SNP)
Professor Jim Saker, the president of the Institute of the Motor
Industry, has warned about the threat that Chinese-manufactured
electric vehicles could pose, in giving China access to big data
and personal information. He has said that
“connected electric vehicles flooding the country could be the
most effective Trojan Horse that the Chinese establishment
has”
to impact the UK. What consideration has the Deputy Prime
Minister given to the threat posed by those vehicles?
The Deputy Prime Minister
That too is an important point. Obviously, any new technology or
cars put on the UK market will have to meet our safety standards,
and that will include an assessment of the threats to which the
hon. Lady has referred. Under the National Security and
Investment Act 2021, I can decide to block or impose conditions
on any investments or transactions, from whichever state, and
whichever company, in any country. That is another tool in our
weaponry that we did not have previously.
(Clwyd West) (Con)
My right hon. Friend will no doubt be aware that the Electoral
Commission failed a National Cyber Security Centre cyber
essentials audit at about the time when these breaches occurred.
Among the failings identified was the fact that staff laptops and
smartphones were running outdated systems—including Windows 10
Enterprise, which, at the time, was no longer receiving security
updates. Does my right hon. Friend not agree that these failings
look awfully like extraordinary negligence on the part of the
Electoral Commission, and how satisfied is he that the commission
has done everything necessary to regularise its procedures?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend is right to highlight that issue. It is
precisely because of those concerns that we have ensured that the
Electoral Commission is working closely with the National Cyber
Security Centre to achieve a significant step up in its
capabilities and its cyber resilience. It was essential for that
work to be undertaken, and it has been undertaken.
(Rother Valley)
(Con)
In May this year, Rotherham will hold a local election, like
other places throughout the country. At the last local election,
in 2021, Labour kept control of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough
Council by a margin of only 54 electors. What steps are the
Government taking to ensure that when people cast their votes for
the Conservatives in Rotherham, those votes to end 50 years of
Labour rule are secure?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I trust and hope that we will achieve that outcome. I would like
to assure Members that we have every confidence in the integrity
of the elections. Through the defending democracy taskforce and
the action taken by the Minister responsible for local
government, my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (), who has written to all local
authorities in the past week, we are ensuring that the integrity
of those important elections is preserved.
Mr Deputy Speaker ( )
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement today, and
for responding to questions for over an hour.
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